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ON WHOSE BEHALF? UNDERLYING CONFLICTS OF
THE ANTIDUMPING STANDING RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
The desire to protect American industry from foreign competition
has a long history, and the specific concern with the "dumping" of for-
eign products onto the American market dates back to 1916.1 Although
the early Tariff Acts and Trade Agreements Acts attempted to encourage
free trade by reducing tariffs, later amendments have imposed higher tar-
iffs because of the belief that foreign importers are not competing fairly
with United States industries.2 To this day, the two priorities of free
trade and protection for industry shift constantly because of conflicts not
only between foreign and domestic manufacturers but among domestic
producers as well.3
One method through which foreign importers allegedly deal unfairly
in United States markets is by "dumping" products. The statutory defi-
nition of "dumping" is the sale, in the United States, of foreign merchan-
dise "at less than its fair value" resulting in or likely to result in material
injury to a United States industry.4 The remedy prescribed by the pres-
ent antidumping statute is the imposition of antidumping tariffs, in addi-
tion to any normal tariffs, on the dumped goods.5 Ideally, this statutory
scheme would equalize import and domestic product prices. However,
other factors such as multilateral trade agreements often affect the ability
1. Mattice & Cunningham, High Technology Imports and the U.S. Countervailing Duty
and Antidumping Laws, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 189, 206 n.72 (1984). Coun-
tervailing duty laws, which will not be the focus of this discussion, involve subsidies by foreign
governments on imports to the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982) for a description
of the countervailing duty laws.
2. H. PIQUET, THE TRADE AGREEMENTS AcT AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 15-17
(1958). According to Mr. Piquet, the policy of the original Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was
to achieve a reciprocal exchange of tariff reductions as a form of relief for domestic industries
affected by foreign competition. Id. at 13.
3. See, e.g., Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984)
(a sole steel manufacturer, which lacked the support of its industry, could not bring a suit to
impose antidumping duties "on behalf of" its industry); Jewel Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas
Fla., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (domestic importing firm had standing to sue
another domestic importer for antidumping duties).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The countervailing duty statute contains
the same material injury requirement and is on the whole very similar to the antidumping
statutes. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982) for a description of the injury requirement under the
countervailing duty statute.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. The foreign importers may petition to substitute a different remedy
for antidumping duties. See infra note 120.
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of domestic manufacturers to obtain relief from what they believe to be
unfair foreign competition.'
An important limitation on a domestic manufacturer's right to bring
suit for antidumping relief is the standing requirement. The standing
rules require an individual firm to bring an action "on behalf" of an
American industry.7 Because "[t]he standing rules for... antidumping
investigations are still in the process of development," this requirement is
problematic.' However, the fundamental cause of problems concerning
standing is the foreign/domestic and domestic/domestic firm tension.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 mandates that in order to file a peti-
tion requesting the imposition of tariffs, a domestic firm must be "an
interested party" and must file "on behalf of" an industry.9 Although
the 1979 statute defines some of these terms, the meaning of "on behalf
of" an industry is not explained in the statute. The "representative na-
ture of the petitioner" is "[a] factor which has recently gained signifi-
cance."' Other statutes, such as the Revenue Act of 1916, do not
include such stringent standing requirements. Judicial attempts to inter-
pret the standing provisions are few and incomplete,11 leaving American
industries with an uncertain remedy.
One of the effects of the 1979 Act has been that it discourages suits
by individual firms as a result of its requirement that they represent their
industry. This requirement causes competition and conflicts between
large and small domestic firms. If courts interpret the "on behalf of" an
industry clause to require the support of a majority of the industry, then
a single manufacturer would be unable to protect itself without the ap-
proval of the entire industry.12 Similarly, where a majority of the indus-
6. L. A. Times, Nov. 2, 1985, pt. IV, at 1, col. 5. The Times article concerned European
Economic Community (EEC) steel producers who by agreement were bound to limit their
share of the United States market to 5.4%. Despite the agreement, the EEC had captured
6.6% of the American steel market.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1982); see also 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) for the unfair competi-
tion statute which provides both criminal and civil remedies, requires a showing of intent to
injure an industry, but does not require a petition on behalf of an industry.
8. Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,9852,
48,9853 (1985) (Gilmore did not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must prove that at
least 51% of the industry supports the plaintiff's position). See infra note 11.
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1). The countervailing duty statute contains the same standing
requirement. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (1982).
10. J. PATTISoN, 3 ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS 2-7 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. 670 (single domestic steel plate manufacturer brought
an antidumping petition as an interested party and on behalf of the steel plate industry). For a
discussion of Gilmore, see infra text accompanying notes 98-108.
12. See, e.g., Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. 670. The adoption of this interpretation was urged by
the United States Commerce Department. See infra text accompanying note 103.
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try signs an agreement with importers promising to bar all American
antidumping petitions in exchange for an increase in import prices, an
individual firm within that industry which did not sign the agreement
may have no recourse."3 In addition, conflicts may occur within a single
manufacturing firm such as one where both domestic and foreign divi-
sions exist, where products are partially made in the United States and
partially made abroad, or where a firm relies on foreign parts which are
incorporated into domestically produced goods. 4
These conflicts raise policy questions: should each individual firm
be protected regardless of impact on the entire United States market, or
should agreements between importers and domestic firms be favored?
This Comment will focus on the standing requirements of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 and the Revenue Act of 1916. Specifically, it
discusses the history, statutory language and procedures of United States
antidumping laws and how courts have interpreted standing require-
ments relating to those laws. In addition, this Comment discusses other
possible remedies for individual firms harmed by the dumping of prod-
ucts into their markets. Finally, this Comment proposes a solution to the
standing problems created by legal ambiguities and market conflicts.
II. ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. Introduction to Antidumping Law
"Dumping" is a practice by which importers sell imported goods in
the United States at less than their fair value. 5 This practice concerns
American industries because it is viewed as unfair competition which un-
dercuts notions of free trade. Fair value is ordinarily determined by
comparing the net factory price in the United States with the net factory
13. See, e.g., Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 672. For a similar example relating to the memory
chip industry, see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
14. In order to understand the potential for conflict within a single firm, one need only
look to the large American car manufacturers which have both domestic and Japanese or
German operations. The foreign division might object to an antidumping suit brought by its
domestic counterpart. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provides for this situation by ex-
cluding such firms from the "industry headcount." See infra text accompanying notes 90-91
for further discussion of the "headcount" exclusion. Although the Act excludes from the
"industry headcount" importing firms or firms related to importers or exporters, the 1979 Act
does not deny standing to firms excluded from the "headcount." For an example of how an
importer was granted standing under the Antidumping Act of 1916, see Jewel Foliage, 497 F.
Supp. at 516-17.
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a thorough discussion of dumping and
the procedures used in an antidumping case, see CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES 28-30 (1986) [hereinafter IMPORTING
INTO THE U.S.].
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price in the home market or in other countries. 6 An antidumping duty
is a special tariff imposed on goods in order to make up the difference
between the importer's selling price and the domestic manufacturer's
price for a similar product.
17
B. Pre-1979 Standing Requirements
1. Revenue Act of 1916
The Revenue Act of 1916 (1916 Act) is the first United States an-
tidumping legislation. 8 Congress passed the 1916 Act because of its
concern that, at the end of World War I, European cartels would over-
whelm nascent American industries by selling stockpiled merchandise at
very low prices. 9 The 1916 Act is a criminal statute requiring "intent of
destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing
the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the
United States."2
The 1916 Act also provides for private party lawsuits in which the
remedies are treble damages and attorney's fees rather than tariff imposi-
tion." This private remedy is limited to injuries resulting from a viola-
tion of the 1916 Act; the private party plaintiff must show the importer's
intent to injure an industry.
Although treble damages are an appealing remedy to prospective
plaintiffs, the 1916 Act has rarely served as the basis for an antidumping
16. IMPORTING INTO THE U.S., supra note 15, at 29-30.
17. Id. at 29. The fundamental concern is that unfair trade practices increase American
unemployment. For example, employment in the steel industry "has fallen 20 percent in re-
cent years... ." N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1985, § 1, at 15, col. 2. Yet the low prices of imports are
not necessarily the cause of industry failure. Rather, "the steel industry's problems could be
traced to slow growth of demand and rising productivity, not merely to imported steel ......
Id. at col. 2-3 (referring to statements made by Robert Z. Lawrence, senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution). In addition, "imports provide substantial numbers of jobs in the
United States . . . ." Id. at col. 3.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982). For a discussion of the 1916 Act, see Victor, United States
Antidumping Rules, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 217, 218-20 (1978).
19. Victor, supra note 18, at 218-19.
20. Id. at 219 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970) (emphasis added)). The statute was probably
framed in terms of intent because of the purposeful dumping by the German dye industry that
served as an impetus for the creation of the 1916 Act. Since the dye dumping involved intent
to injure an industry, legislators at the time probably focused their concerns on intentional
injury. Id. at 218 n.9.
21. Id. at 219. Compare Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985), which prescribes antidumping duties as a remedy for dumping, with the Revenue
Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
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claim.22 This appears to be changing, as one author notes that "despite
[the 1916 Act's] past obscurity, more and more companies are becoming
aware of its existence and instituting lawsuits seeking treble dam-
ages. *23 While the intent requirement might be a drawback,24 the
1916 Act is attractive because it provides a private cause of action, treble
damages and less stringent standing requirements. The 1916 Act allows
suit by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation of, or combination or conspiracy to violate, this section."
25
Thus, the 1916 Act focuses on the individual producer rather than on an
entire industry. An individual producer is able to sue for damages as
long as it can prove the importer's intent to injure an industry.26 Fur-
thermore, no language in the statute suggests that the plaintiff must rep-
resent an industry.
Courts have considered a variety of standing claims under the 1916
Act. In Bywater v. Matsushita Electronic Industries Co.,27 the United
States district court refused to confer standing upon former employees of
a firm which Japanese dumping had allegedly forced out of business.
The court concluded that while the firm had suffered "direct" injury, the
employees had suffered only "incidental" injury. Therefore, the employ-
ees did not have standing to sue.28 The district court in Schwimmer v.
Sony Corp.,29 denied standing to domestic sellers of a like product be-
cause the plaintiff was not a manufacturer. The court suggested that the
1916 Act "was passed to shield local manufacturers"3 even though the
statute does not require plaintiff to be a manufacturer.
However, a different result was reached by the district court in Jewel
22. Since 1916, the United States has never instituted a criminal proceeding under the
1916 Act, and there have been only nine private actions brought. Victor, supra note 18, at 219.
23. Id.
24. "The intent standard of the 1916 Act, adopted due to the criminal aspects of the stat-
ute, poses a major obstacle to many possible petitioners under the law." J. PATISON, supra
note 10, at 15-9. The courts have recognized various ways to prove intent. See, e.g., Utah Pie
Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12, 703-04 (1967) (defendant's radical
price cuts, drastically declining price structure, persistent unprofitable sales below cost and
related economic circumstances are all evidence of intent); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 723 F.2d 319, 328-30 (3d Cir. 1983) (home market price stabilization agreements,
agreements to export surplus production at depressed prices, export cartels focusing on the
United States, and concealment of dumping through secret rebating constitute proof of intent).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1916), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 73,759, 91,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. Id. at 91,202-03.
29. 471 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
30. Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
January 1987]
578 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:573
Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida, Inc.3 I The court held that a
domestic importing firm had standing to sue another importer under the
1916 Act. According to the court, "[tihe term 'manufacturer' is not even
contained in the Act.... The literal language of the Act would appear to
allow persons other than the domestic manufacturers to seek redress
under the Act."3 2 Finally, in Western Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui
& Co., 31 the Ninth Circuit decided that a domestic reinforced concrete
manufacturer did not have standing to sue its competitor. Here, the
firm's competitor bought "dumped" steel reinforcement, which allowed
the competitor to sell its finished product at a lower price than the plain-
tiff.34 The court explained that the injured industry in that case was the
steel industry, not the concrete industry.35
A survey of the case law illustrates that parties other than manufac-
turers do have standing to sue as long as the defendant engaged in dump-
ing, intended to injure plaintiff's industry and directly injured plaintiff.
2. Antidumping Act of 1921
By enacting the Antidumping Act of 1921 (1921 Act),36 Congress
responded to "unfairly low prices on sales to the United States."37 The
1921 Act was an administrative rather than a judicial proceedings statute
and did not require intent to injure.3 8 Because of their differing ap-
proaches, the 1916 and 1921 Acts co-existed for many years. The 1921
Act contained comparatively simple standing requirements. 39 The 1921
Act required a petitioner to merely show "injury" rather than "material
injury."'  Like the 1916 Act, the 1921 Act allowed petitions by "any
31. 497 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
32. Id. at 516.
33. 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. Id. at 1019-20.
35. Id. at 1019.
36. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171, repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501,
2585 (1982).
37. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING Du-
TIES 11 (S. Unger ed. 1982) [hereinafter COMMERCE SPEAKS].
38. Victor, supra note 18, at 220.
39. Barcell6 III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal it or Revise it, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL
STUD. 53, 55 (1979).
40. Id. Mr. Barcell6, in comparing the 1921 Act to other types of laws which protect
against antidumping, states that "safeguard" provisions require "serious" injury and proof
that the imports were a "substantial cause" of the injury. Id. The safeguard provisions to
which he refers are the escape clause and adjustment assistance in trade legislation. Id. at 53.
The escape clause allowed the United States to evade its obligations under a trade agreement
when it became clear that the terms of the agreement were injurious to United States indus-
tries. Domestic subsidization is a scheme in which the United States government would subsi-
dize American industries in order to compensate industries injured by dumping.
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person." 4 1
The 1921 Act, as amended, continued as the United States an-
tidumping law until it was expressly repealed by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979.42
3. Tariff Act of 1930
The Tariff Act of 1930 (1930 Act) still exists today as the basic tariff
law framework.43 Although no antidumping provision appeared in the
1930 Act, it did contain an "Unfair Practices in Import Trade" provi-
sion.44 The Unfair Practices section does not contain any standing re-
quirements but simply states that: "The [International Trade]
Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on
complaint under oath or upon its initiative."45 The remedy for unfair
practices under the 1930 Act is to exclude from the American market the
goods in question.4 6 Section 1337 does not apply to "foreign unfair trade
practices specifically addressed by other statutes, such as
dumping."'47
4. Amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930: the Trade Agreements
Act program
Since 1934, Congress has periodically amended the 1930 Act by im-
plementing Trade Agreements Acts.48 Trade Agreements Acts develop
out of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).49 The first
amendment to the 1930 Act, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, was to
increase United States exports by way of a "reciprocal lowering of tariffs
and other trade barriers."5" At the time the 1934 Act was passed, tariffs
41. Wasserman, Injury from Dumping: The Problem of the "Regional Industry," 9 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 470 (1979) (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 153.26(a) (1977)). Compare infra text
accompanying note 96 (the 1979 Act has stringent standing requirements for petitioners) with
19 C.F.R. § 153.26(a) (1977).
42. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1982)).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1202-1677e (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The 1930 Act contains rules regard-
ing tariff levels on specific products, administrative procedure and unfair competition. The
1930 Act is a comprehensive tariff scheme.
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1982).
46. Id. § 1337(d) (1982).
47. Comment, "Domestic Industry--The Definition Applied by the International Trade
Commission in Considering Relief Under Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, 7 GEo. MASON
L. REv. 263, 263 (1984).
48. H. PIQUET, supra note 2, at 12-13.
49. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
50. H. PIQUET, supra note 2, at 13.
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were at their highest levels in United States history.5 I As a consequence,
other countries retaliated by raising their import barriers. The 1934 Act
reflected Congress' attempt to strengthen the United States export mar-
ket which had been weakened by trade barriers and the Depression. 2
C. Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Legislative History
1. Result of multilateral negotiations
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1979 Act) resulted from a
round of multilateral trade negotiations called the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade Tokyo Round.53 The goal of the Tokyo Round was
the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, such as import quotas and
product standards.14 Despite this focus, the Tokyo Round also negoti-
ated a reduction in tariff rates.5
American industry had a voice in the Tokyo Round in two impor-
tant respects. First, the Trade Act of 197456 established technical and
policy advisory committees that were composed of representatives from
domestic industry, labor and agriculture.57 The function of these com-
mittees was to report to Congress on whether any of the proposed agree-
ments under the Tokyo Round would promote domestic interests and
achieve trade reciprocity.58 Thus, representatives from domestic indus-
try could alert Congress to any agreements that were in conflict with
industry's best interests. In addition, the Advisory Committee for Trade
Negotiations, a composition of private sector company officials, repre-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 12. The 1934 Act restricted tariff reduction to 50% of 1934 levels. Id. at 13.
53. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, TRADE AGREEMENTS
AcT OF 1979 AND MTN ANALYSIS (1979), [hereinafter MTN ANALYSIS]. These negotiations
took place under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) program. GATT is
an international, multilateral trade agreement which has been in existence since 1947. GAIT
also embodies negotiation rules. Parties to GAT, including the United States, periodically
negotiate specific trade agreements. The Tokyo Round was such an agreement. See H. PI-
QUET, supra note 2, at 14.
54. MTN ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 1-2.
55. Id. at 4. The United States proposed a tariff rate cut of up to 60%, but the final rate
cut was 33%. Id. Although "more open and equitable market access," was a congressional
negotiating objective, Congress was concerned that the international trade rules were stacked
against the interests of the United States. Id. at 3.
56. The Trade Act of 1974 was created to give the President authority to negotiate as well
as to establish objectives for United States negotiations in the Tokyo Round. Id. at 2, 4-5.
57. Id. at 2-3.
58. Id. Resulting agreements regulated, for example, aircraft, steel, beef, and dairy prod-
ucts. Procedural agreements included a countervailing duty and subsidies code, rules on dis-
pute settlement, import licensing rules, and a government procurement code (for the purpose
of opening up previously closed world markets). Id. at 5.
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sented United States agriculture, industry and labor.59
Second, the United States negotiated towards "Sectoral Agree-
ments."60 The idea behind such agreements was to create the same op-
portunities for both importers to the United States and United States
exporters abroad within the same sector of the market.61 For example,
under these sectoral agreements, an Italian firm importing shoes to the
United States would have the same access to the United States market as
an American firm exporting shoes to Italy would have to the Italian mar-
ket. For the steel sector, the International Steel Arrangement (ISA) was
created in 1978.62 The objectives of the ISA were to assure free steel
trade, reduce trade barriers and facilitate crisis management between
governments.63 One of the reasons given for the formation of the ISA is
that "individual attempts to respond to domestic steel problems 'can ag-
gravate the problems of other [nations].' "61 This reflects the policy of
multilateral rather than individual solutions embraced by the Tokyo
Rounds.
When the Tokyo Rounds concluded in 1979, twenty-three countries
including the United States were signatories to all of the resulting agree-
ments.6 The United States, as a signatory, implemented the Tokyo
Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations by way of the 1979 Act.66
In addition to implementing the agreements of the Tokyo Round,
the 1979 Act responded to criticism of the 1921 Antidumping Act by
changing the law.67 Manufacturers cited two problems with the old law.
First, foreign importers complained that the United States, unlike any
other major trading partner, did not have an injury requirement for im-
59. Id. at 3. The Advisory Committee also played an important role in obtaining industry
support for the agreements of the Tokyo Round. Id.
60. Id. at 5-6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 135-36 for a discussion of how the multilateral
trade agreement involved in the Gilmore case would have been abrogated had Gilmore been
allowed to bring its suit.
65. MTN ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 5. The other signatories were: Argentina, Austra-
lia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the European Economic Community (EEC),
Finland, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Although the
Tokyo Round aimed at bringing developing countries more equally into the trade process,
most of the developing nations were dissatisfied with the concessions made by developed coun-
tries. As a result, most developing countries signed only isolated agreements or none at all.
Id.
66. Id. at 11. The 1979 Act came into being on July 26, 1979. Id.
67. Id. at 12-13.
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position of countervailing duties." Second, foreign and domestic firms
alike complained about the length of United States antidumping proceed-
ings.69 Changes in the proceedings included shorter deadlines.70 Thus,
the 1979 Act amended the Tariff Act of 1930, added antidumping lan-
guage to it and repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921. 7 '
Language in GATT strongly suggests that parties to GATT are con-
cerned about possible abuses of antidumping laws.72 GATT's standard
for antidumping duties is that:
No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping... duty on
the importation of any product of the territory of another con-
tracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dump-
ing.., is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an
established domestic industry, or is such as to prevent or mate-
rially retard the establishment of a domestic industry.73
The terms contained in the foregoing are the terms Congress
adopted in the 1979 Act.74 Thus, the requirement of injury to a domestic
industry originated in GATT.75
2. Congressional history and judicial interpretation
a. interested party
Congress wished to define which "person[s]" under the 1921 Act
and 1930 Act had "sufficient interest [in the industry] to always be con-
sidered interested parties."' 76 The Congressional history does not illus-
68. Even for antidumping, the injury requirement was easily satisfied. See supra note 40.
69. MTN ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 12.
70. Id.
71. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 42. Congress' purposes in adopting the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 were:
(1) to approve and implement the trade agreements negotiated [under the Tokyo
Round];
(2) to foster the growth and maintenance of an open world trading system;
(3) to expand opportunities for the commerce of the United States in international
trade; and
(4) to improve the rules of international trade and to provide for the enforcement of
such rules, and for other purposes.
Id. at 19 U.S.C. § 2502 (1982).
72. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 61 Stat.
A23 [hereinafter GATTI.
73. GATT, supra note 72, pt. I, art. VI(5).
74. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. GATT, supra note 72, pt. I, art. VI(5). The GATT arrangements were "directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discrim-
inatory treatment in international commerce." GATT, supra note 72, preamble.
76. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-90, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 381, 475-76.
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trate why Congress thought this definition was necessary. Interestingly,
Congress provided that "[t]he definition should not be interpreted as lim-
iting the authority of the administering authority or the [International
Trade Commission] to permit participation in antidumping... duty pro-
ceedings by other persons with an appropriate interest unless the provi-
sions of the bill require such an interpretation."" From this statement, it
appears that Congress intended to establish a presumption that certain
categories of petitioners would always be considered interested parties,
78
while keeping the door open for other parties who could prove their
interest.
The "interested party" requirement became an issue in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States,79 where the Court of International Trade required
that the petitioner be a producer, union or trade association within the
industry. Therefore, groups, which had only a general interest in the
issue but not a specific interest in the specific product, would not be inter-
ested parties.80
b. representation
Even though the 1930 Act did not define "industry," 1 Congress in-
cluded in the 1979 Act practices which the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) had been following. Apparently Congress saw the need to
narrow the definition of an industry.82 In the legislative history, Con-
gress established three categories of parties that would satisfy the "indus-
try" requirement:
(1) All the domestic producers who produce products like
the imported articles subject to the investigation... ;
(2) domestic producers, whenever located in the United
States, who comprise less than the entire group of producers of
like products, if the total output of this smaller group of produ-
cers constitute a major proportion of the total domestic produc-
tion of that product; or
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id. at 89. Among the categories with a presumption of interest are the importer or
manufacturer of the goods in question; the government of the country where the goods are
produced; the United States manufacturer, producer or wholesaler of a like product; a repre-
sentative union; or a trade or business association. Id.
79. No. 83-32, slip op. 39, 39-40 (Cust. B. & Dec. May 11, 1983).
80. Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 670, 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
81. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 381, 468.
82. Id. at 83. Congress stated that the new language in the 1979 Act "delineates important
concepts with respect to the definition and treatment of the term 'industry.'" Id.
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(3) a regional industry.13
Congress explained that, in category (2), "a major proportion of to-
tal domestic production will vary from case to case depending on the
facts, and no standard minimum proportion is required in each case." 4
Thus, Congress left the representation question open to a case-by-case
determination.
D. Language of the 1979 Act
Section 1673 of the 1979 Act states the circumstances under which
antidumping duties will be imposed on importers. Its language compels
two preliminary determinations by two separate bodies. First, the statute
includes requirements that the "administering authority" (the Interna-
tional Trade Administration (ITA)) 5 must determine whether a "class
or kind of foreign merchandise" is sold or is likely to be sold in the
United States "at less than its fair value."816 Second, the ITC must find
that: (a) an industry in the United States is either materially injured or
threatened with material injury; or (b) the establishment of an industry in
the United States is materially retarded by the importation.
8 7
The statute defines "industry" as "the domestic producers as a
whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of the
like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic produc-
tion of that product."88 The statute also provides that smaller, regional
industries may exist in addition to national industries.19
In addition, under appropriate circumstances the statute excludes
certain firms when determining the extent of industry support for an an-
tidumping petition. The excluded firms are those related to exporters or
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982), the administering authority is actually the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. In 1980, the Secretary delegated this responsibility to the Department of
Commerce.
86. Id. § 1673(l). For an explanation of "less than fair value," see supra text accompany-
ing note 16. Under § 1677(4)(D), the "class or kind" of merchandise must be "like" a class of
merchandise manufactured in the United States.
87. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1). Unfortunately, the statute does not define "establishment of an
industry," nor does it specify who would be eligible to petition in the case of an industry which
is not yet established.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C) (1982). The test for a regional industry is as follows:
(i) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of
the like product in question in that market, and
(ii) the demand in that market is not supplied to any substantial degree, by
producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the United States.
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importers who are themselves importers of the goods in question.9" The
purpose of this exclusion is to prevent United States manufacturers that
have an interest in the imported goods from skewing the ITC's industry
determination. However, this provision is discretionary because it states
that it "may" be applied and because there is no definition of "appropri-
ate circumstances."91
The language of the 1979 Act prescribes two separate procedures for
the initiation of an antidumping duty investigation. 92 First, the statute
mandates that such an investigation "shall be commenced" when the
ITA has information that warrants an investigation into whether duties
should be imposed under section 1673. 93 Second, the investigation may
be initiated by petition.94 The two key phrases regarding the petitioner
are "interested party" and "on behalf of an industry." 95 The statute fur-
ther defines the phrase "interested party" as a "manufacturer, producer,
or wholesaler" of a product like the imported product or a union or busi-
ness association interested in the product.96 The statute does not define
the language "on behalf of" an industry.
In Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States,97 the United States Court of
International Trade (CIT) defined the phrase "on behalf of" an industry.
Gilmore Steel brought an antidumping petition, on behalf of a national
industry, against several European steel plate manufacturers. 9 Gilmore
stood alone in its national complaint and "was the only producer of this
90. Id. § 1677(4)(B).
91. Id. The discretionary language is as follows: "[T]he term 'industry' may be applied in
appropriate circumstances by excluding such producers from those included in that industry."
Id. The legislative history does provide an example:
[W]here a U.S. producer is related to a foreign exporter and the foreign exporter
directs his exports to the United States so as not to compete with his related U.S.
producer, this should be a case where the ITC would not consider the related U.S.
producer to be a part of the domestic industry.
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 83, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 381, 469.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
93. Id. § 1673a(a) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 1673a(b) (1982). Since the initiation by petition approach has more potential for
conflict, this discussion will focus on it rather than on the initation by administering authority
approach. The Commerce Department rarely initiates investigations. For instance, on De-
cember 6, 1985, the Commerce Department filed its first self-initiated action since 1981. L.A.
Times, Dec. 7, 1985, pt. IV, at 1, col. 5. The moral is that if domestic industries desire relief
from antidumping, they must take action themselves.
95. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (1982).
96. Id. § 1677(9)(C), (D), (E) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
97. 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
98. Id. at 672. Gilmore alleged that it had been injured by Belgian and West German
imports of steel plate. Id.
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merchandise to testify in support of the petition." 99 In addition, many
large steel plate producers expressly denied support for Gilmore's
petition."'t
Gilmore argued that the phrase "on behalf of" an industry "refers
to the scope of relief being sought by the petitioner."'' The government
argued that "the plain language of that phrase refers to the extent of
producer support within an industry."'"2 In order to justify this argu-
ment, the government pointed out that "the relief sought under an an-
tidumping petition automatically inures to the benefit of the affected
industry if that petition is ultimately sustained."'1 3 The CIT accepted
the government's definition, and established a "two-step sifting process"
in which the petitioner must prove status as an interested party and
prove "that a majority of that industry backs its petition."'" To Gil-
more's contentions that this interpretation resulted in "tyranny of the
majority," the court responded that "the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
is drafted throughout in terms of relief to an industry, not to individual
manufacturers or producers."105 Considering the lack of support for Gil-
more's petition,' 6 the court determined that Gilmore could not bring its
petition on behalf of a national industry. The court remanded Gilmore's
regional claim, however, in order to establish the "existence of a regional
industry."'0 7 This left open the question of whether Gilmore could val-
idly bring a petition on behalf of a regional industry.
E. Petitioning Procedure
When a firm believes that its business has been injured by the dump-
ing practices of a foreign industry, the firm may petition the ITA. The
petitioner must allege that a class of foreign goods is or is likely to be sold
in the United States at less than its fair value and that a domestic indus-
99. Id. at 673.
100. The firms which opposed the petition were: Bethlehem Steel Corp.; Inland Co.; Jones
and Laughlin Steel Inc.; Lukes Steel Co.; National Steel Corp.; Phoenix Steel Corp.; U.S. Steel
Corp.; Armco Inc.; and Republic Steel Corp. Id.
101. Id. at 675.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 676.
104. Id.
105. Id. According to the court, if the standing requirement creates any unfairness, that
unfairness is reduced by the provision excluding from the "industry headcount" those manu-
facturers who are either related to importers or who are importers themselves. Id. at 676-77.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
106. Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 676-77.
107. Id. at 677. The ITA interpreted the ITC's inaction on the regional claim as a negative
finding. Id.
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try is materially injured or threatened with injury.108 In addition, the
petitioner must supply any "reasonably available" information which
supports the allegations. 109
The ITA will investigate the validity of the allegations by comparing
the United States price of the imported goods with "either prices in the
foreign home market, prices to third countries, or constructed value,
which is the cost of production plus overhead and profit."'110 If the ITA
decides that an investigation is in order, it will advise the ITC to make a
preliminary injury investigation."'
However, if the ITA and the ITC make positive preliminary find-
ings, the United States Customs Service will suspend liquidation of the
merchandise until a final determination is made." 2 The importer will
then be required to post a cash deposit or bond for the estimated differ-
ence between the foreign market value and the United States price.'
13
The ITA then has seventy-five days in which to make its final determina-
tion. If it makes an affirmative final decision, it will convey its findings
to the ITC."I4
Part of the ITA's standing evaluation is to send questionnaires to
domestic firms within the industry." 5 The purpose of the questionnaires
is to determine the existence and extent of support for and opposition to
108. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1982).
110. COMMERCE SPEAKS, supra note 37, at 11. The preferred measure of comparison, the
home market price, is adjusted in order that the comparison be fair.
111. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(d) (1982). See Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp.
670, 672 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). The ITA will also publish notice of the investigation in the
Federal Register and will obtain other necessary information. If the ITA decides that the
petition does not meet the requirements, the ITA will dismiss the petition with notice to peti-
tioner and the Federal Register. COMMERCE SPEAKS, supra note 37, at 64. If the trade agree-
ment restricts the quantity of goods that may enter the United States, a pending antidumping
petition may not be terminated unless the ITA determines that "termination on the basis of
that agreement is in the public interest." 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985). The pub-
lic interest factors to be considered are:
(i) whether, based upon the relative impact on consumer prices and the availability
of supplies of the merchandise, the agreement would have a greater adverse impact
on United States consumers than the imposition of antidumping duties;
(ii) the relative impact on the international economic interests of the United States;
and
(iii) the relative impact on the competitiveness of the domestic industry producing
the like merchandise, including any such impact on employment and investment in
that industry.
19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a)(2)(B).
112. COMMERCE SPEAKS, supra note 37, at 67.
113. Id. at 68.
114. Id. at 70-72.
115. See Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,9852,
48,9853 (1985); Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 673.
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the petition." 6 The ITC also performs a standing check in the form of
public conferences at which firms may express support for or opposition
to the petition.'17 If the ITC also makes an affirmative final determina-
tion, the ITA will issue an antidumping order to Customs.1
8 Customs'
responsibility at that point is to assess a duty equal to the difference be-
tween the foreign and the United States price." 9 From the petitioner's
viewpoint, the imposition of antidumping duties is the ultimate goal of
the process. A negative final or preliminary determination by the ITC
automatically terminates the petition upon publication of the determina-
tion.' 20 Even so, the petitioner still has recourse to the judiciary in the
United States Court of International Trade."'
III. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS IN THE STANDING REQUIREMENT
A. Protection for Individual Firms
At issue is whether Congress intended to provide relief for individ-
ual firms when there is a conflict within the industry as a whole. The
standing requirement of the 1979 Act can keep a party with no real inter-
est in the case from dictating a rule to those who have a vital interest in
the outcome. However, the requirement may also prevent a firm with a
valid complaint from obtaining relief simply because that firm lacks in-
dustry support.
As Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States 22 reveals, the phrase "on
behalf of" an industry was not fully defined by the statute. 23 The Gil-
more court determined that industry support was essential to an an-
tidumping petition brought on behalf of a national industry, and that
despite Gilmore's complaint of "tyranny of the majority," the 1979 Act
116. Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg. at 48,9853
(holding that "[n]othing in the statute or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended
that anyone wishing to file a petition be required to poll all of the domestic industry"). Id.
(emphasis added).
117. Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 673.
118. COMMERCE SPEAKS, supra note 37, at 74. However, even after both the ITA and ITC
have made positive determinations, these authorities may still rescind their decisions. See, e.g.,
Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 672-73 (ITA can rescind its affirmative finding on the standing issue
even after ITC returned an affirmative preliminary injury determination).
119. COMMERCE SPEAKS, supra note 37, at 74. Importers may suspend the antidumping
investigations by agreeing to revise United States prices or by agreeing to cease the imports.
Id. at 75-77. In either case, the agreements must include importers "who account for substan-
tially all of the imports of that merchandise." Id. at 75-76.
120. Id. at 75.
121. Id. at 257.
122. 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
123. The dispute in Gilmore arose because "on behalf of" is not defined. The court resorted
to interpretation of the clause. Id. at 675-76.
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"is drafted throughout in terms of relief to an industry, not to individual
manufacturers."124 The validity of the court's statement is not clear,
however, because an examination of the Act's historical background il-
lustrates an ongoing exchange of priorities between protecting the needs
of both individual firms and the entire industry.125
The position of the individual manufacturer in the scheme of things
is unclear. Considering the 1979 Act added the interested party and rep-
resentation language, it appears that Congress made a conscious decision
to favor whole industries over individual firms at least where tariff impo-
sition is concerned. On the other hand, certain provisions of the statute
suggest that Congress was also concerned with fairness towards individu-
als. For example, the provision which excludes manufacturers who are
also importers or who are related to importers from the determination of
"industry" '26 tends to support the latter concept.
The congressional history indicates that despite the more stringent
definitions, Congress left both the representation and interested party
questions open to a case-by-case analysis. 2 7 The history shows that
Congress recognized the difficulties that the 1979 Act posed for firms
lacking the support of a majority of the industry.'28
The problem with a loose interpretation of the 1979 standing re-
quirements is that the remedy of tariff imposition "inures to the benefit of
the affected industry"' 29 but may in certain circumstances inure to the
detriment of the industry. 130 The advantage of the 1916 Act over the
1979 Act is that the 1916 Act grants treble civil damages, thus compen-
sating the plaintiff without affecting the tariff system or other firms that
oppose the tariffs.
B. The Role of Trade Agreements between Domestic Firms and
Foreign Importers
One congressional purpose in passing the 1979 Act was to "approve
and implement the trade agreements negotiated under the [Tokyo
Round]."'' The Commerce Department attaches importance to agree-
124. Id. at 676.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 37-75.
126. See supra text accompanying note 90.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 76-84.
128. Id.
129. Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 676 (emphasis added).
130. In Gilmore, there was a clear possibility of detriment to the industry as the EEC could
abrogate its arrangement with the United States as a result of Gilmore's petition. See infra text
accompanying note 136.
131. 19 U.S.C. § 2502(1) (1982).
January 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:573
ments between domestic and foreign firms. In Gilmore Steel Corp. v.
United States,132 the Commerce Department was a party to the agree-
ment in question.'33 A major issue in Gilmore was the role which a trade
agreement between other domestic producers and the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) played in the denial of Gilmore's petition.
One year before Gilmore brought its petition, the Department of Com-
merce, the major United States steel producers and the EEC agreed that
the EEC would restrict steel imports in exchange for the United States
steel producers' promise to drop all pending antidumping proceedings
against the EEC steel manufacturers.' 34 The agreement could be abro-
gated if any United States steel producer, including those which did not
take part in the agreement, brought antidumping proceedings against the
EEC.135 Gilmore, a non-signatory of the agreement, alleged that the rea-
son the International Trade Administration denied Gilmore's petition
was because of pressure from signatories of the agreement.
36
The unusual history of this case tends to support Gilmore's claim on
this point. The ITA initially found that Gilmore's petition satisfied the
requirements of the statute and published notice of investigation. 137 The
ITA then notified the ITC that an investigation was in order, and the
ITC made a preliminary finding of injury to the national industry while
remaining silent on the regional industry issue.'13 However, two months
later, the ITA rescinded its decision in Gilmore's favor on the grounds
that the other firms in the industry did not support the petition., 39 The
132. 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
133. Id. at 672.
134. 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058 (1982). On July 31, 1986, the United States and Japan came to an
agreement regarding the dumping of Japanese memory chips onto the American market. L.A.
Times, Aug. 1, 1986, pt. I, at 1, col. 6. The United States Commerce Department had filed its
own dumping complaint against Japanese importers in December, 1985. L.A. Times, Dec. 7,
1985, pt. IV, at 1, col. 5. The settlement of the complaint included an agreement by the
Commerce Department to suspend two pending antidumping cases in return for Japan's agree-
ment to establish dumping monitoring systems and to help American memory chip manufac-
turers gain 20% of the Japanese market. L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 1986, pt. I, at 1, col. 6. In
addition, Japan agreed to a price increase on its memory chips. Ironically, American computer
manufacturers that use Japanese memory chips in the production of computers complained
that the new higher price of Japanese chips will force American computer firms to take their
manufacturing work abroad. L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1986, pt. IV, at 1, col. 2. This recent
example exemplifies: (a) how trade agreements can have an affect on pending antidumping
suits; and (b) how such trade agreements can have a detrimental effect on other American
industries and ultimately on the American economy.
135. Gilmore, 585 F. Supp. at 672.
136. Id. at 678.
137. Id. at 672.
138. Id.
139. Id. The court disagreed with Gilmore's argument that the ITA can reverse its prelimi-
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ITA determined that the ITC's silence on the regional issue represented a
negative finding and dismissed Gilmore's entire petition.""4 Gilmore al-
leged that the EEC had influenced the ITA's decision by threatening to
abrogate the agreement."'
Although Gilmore's claim raised questions regarding the proper
role of separate importer/domestic producer agreements in antidumping
proceedings, the court did not address that issue. 42 It ignored the con-
flict between Gilmore's need to protect its business from the effects of
dumping, and the United States/EEC agreement, which benefitted the
entire United States steel industry by restricting steel imports to the
United States. A federal circuit judicial conference' 43 shed more light on
the role of the agreement in this case:
It was perceived by the Department of Commerce that this
case, if it had gone through the administrative process, would
have led to the demise of the steel arrangement between the
United States and the European community. Yet the Depart-
ment of Commerce could not find any basis not to initiate the
investigation.... When the ITC determination was referred
back to the Department of Commerce for its investigation,
Commerce terminated the case despite the ITC affirmative
determination. 1"
Since the United States/EEC arrangement applies to any United
States producer, it could still play a role in Gilmore's remanded regional
claim.'45 The question of whether Gilmore Steel could bring a petition
on behalf of a regional industry was not decided by the court. Rather,
nary finding only if there is a negative injury or Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) decision. Id. at
673-74.
140. Id. at 673.
141. Id. at 678. Gilmore claimed that there had been certain ex parte communications
between the ITA and the EEC, but the court rejected this claim as irrelevant because Gilmore
was not harmed by such communications. The court's justification for such a ruling was that
Gilmore did not have standing as a national industry in any case, and that Gilmore's regional
industry claim was being remanded.
142. Id. at 679. The court dismissed any communications between the ITA and the EEC as
irrelevant because Gilmore could not establish a claim on behalf of a national industry and
because Gilmore's regional claim was being remanded. "If there were unrecorded ex parte
communications, the prejudice to Gilmore flowing from them have now been cured." Id.
143. 104 F.R.D. 207 (1984). These are annual conferences held to discuss recent decisions
and developments in the federal circuit courts. This particular session was the International
Trade Breakout Session in which the International Trade Law section of the Federal Circuit
Courts and the Court of International Trade participated.
144. Id. at 285.
145. The United States/European Economic Community Agreement states that "[i]f such
petitions are filed or litigation commenced by petitioners other than [parties to the agreement],
the [EEC] shall be entitled to terminate the Arrangement .... 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058, 49,061.
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the case was remanded to the ITC on the issue of the existence of a re-
gional industry. 46
The decision in Gilmore was discussed by the ITA in the Malaysia
Textile decision, which was a subsequent countervailing duty proceed-
ing.147 There, the ITA distinguished Gilmore because "a majority of the
U.S. industry affirmatively opposed Gilmore's petitions,"' 48 while in the
Malaysia Textile case the petitioner had the support of a substantial per-
centage, though not a majority, of the industry.14 9 The ITA stated that
the Gilmore holding "does not amount to a requirement that a petitioner
somehow prove, when a petition is filed, that at least 51% of an industry
has expressed itself in support of a petition. To the extent that language
in Gilmore suggests such a requirements [sic], such language is dic-
tum."' 50 The ITA concluded that "[n]othing in the statute or its legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended that anyone wishing to file a
petition be required to poll all of the domestic industry."'' The Malay-
sia Textile case left unresolved the issue of whether an agreement be-
tween the importing nation, the United States Commerce Department,
and American manufacturers is itself evidence of affirmative opposition
to antidumping petitions. This issue will no doubt resurface as a result of
the recent United States-Japan settlement on the memory cases.' 5 2
The 1979 Act grew out of the Tokyo Round trade agreements.
5 3
The GATT, whose language the 1979 Act adopted, 5 4 recognized the im-
portance of multilateral trade agreements. The difference between the
1930 Act and the 1979 Act is enormous and illustrates the trend towards
compliance with the GATT and increased trade cooperation.1
5 5
146. 585 F. Supp. at 677-78.
147. Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,9852
(1985). Recall that the standing requirements in the countervailing duty laws are quite similar
to those in the antidumping laws. See supra note 4.





152. See supra note 134 for a discussion of the memory chip settlement.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 53-75.
154. See supra text accompanying note 75.
155. The changes resulted from the addition of antidumping language into the 1979 Act
that had not existed in the TariffAct of 1930. See supra text accompanying notes 42 and 67-71
for an explanation of the relationship between the Antidumping Act of 1921 and the 1979 Act.
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATIONS
A. The Need for Change
Given the current climate in foreign trade, it is reasonable to assume
that more firms will be filing antidumping petitions. To require domestic
firms to go through administrative or judicial proceedings in order to
change the law will only slow the process and perhaps cause further in-
jury to petitioners. Since the Commerce Clause1 56 expressly grants Con-
gress the power to regulate trade between the United States and foreign
nations, Congress should clarify the standing requirements of the 1916
and 1979 Acts. Congress should also determine the role that multilateral
trade agreements play in antidumping procedures.
B. Proposals
1. Congress should define "on behalf of" an industry
Although the 1979 Act seems to clearly require representation of an
industry, this Act does not prescribe how much representation is re-
quired. For example, a firm with the support of 49% of the industry
might very well be viewed as representing its industry, even though it
does not represent an absolute majority. Surely, it would be undesirable
for the government to ignore such a large portion of the industry solely
because it fails to attain a majority. Congress should establish guidelines
for the courts to determine when substantial support by the industry is
enough to satisfy the "on behalf of" an industry clause.
2. Civil damages should be preferred to tariffs
When an individual firm clearly fails to attain the support of a ma-
jority of the industry, the 1979 Act seems to foreclose any remedy for the
firm. The imposition of tariffs is a remedy which has industry-wide
repercussions. For that reason, allowing an individual firm to impose
tariffs which the majority of the industry opposes is not an appropriate
remedy.
A more appropriate remedy would require an individual firm to file
suit under the 1916 Act. Under the 1916 Act, the individual firm could
recover civil damages rather than interfere with a whole system of tariffs.
The problem with this approach is that it requires a showing of intent on
the part of the defendant to injure the industry, and the intent require-
ment has barred many individual firms from obtaining the only form of
relief available to them. To alleviate this problem, Congress should elim-
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
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inate the intent requirement from the civil portion of the 1916 Act. This
would not violate the spirit of the Act, because the intent requirement
more appropriately applies to the criminal portion of the statute.
Another alternative would be to preserve treble damages for inten-
tional injury but to provide compensatory damages for unintentional in-
jury. Additionally, Congress should amend the 1979 Act to incorporate
the 1916 Act's private cause of action. The civil damages approach is the
most appropriate because it preserves tariff systems and trade agreements
among importers, domestic industries, and governments while providing
a civil remedy for individual firms which have been harmed.
3. Exclusion of parties to an agreement from the industry
"headcount"
The 1979 Act excludes from the definition of "industry" those do-
mestic firms which also act as importers of the product in question or
which are "related to" the importers. This restrains those domestic firms
which have an interest in defeating the antidumping petition from being
considered as part of the industry. Domestic firms which are signatories
to agreements with importers are in a similar situation to domestic firms
that are related to the importers; both would have an interest in defeating
the petition. Therefore, Congress should explicitly expand the definition
of "related to" to include those who are involved in such agreements.
This alternative, however, should not be preferred to the approach
of awarding civil damages, because this approach would severely discour-
age trade agreements which benefit the American economy. The Com-
merce Department and many firms recognize the benefits of trade
agreements which assist in settling trade disputes. Allowing individual
relief ir the form of tariffs is no replacement for a comprehensive agree-
ment asla solution to trade problems.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The history of antidumping law reveals that antidumping legislation
is an attempt to balance the rights of firms to protect themselves with the
desire to improve foreign trade by removing trade barriers. The an-
tidumping standing requirements balance the interests of the industry
with the interests of the individual producers and other interested par-
ties. Finally, the case law attempts to balance the interests of those who
have signed trade agreements with those parties who are nonsignatories.
Congress' goal should be to encourage maximum participation between
the various domestic firms in an industry and between foreign and do-
mestic firms. By more precisely defining the standing requirements of
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the 1979 and 1916 Acts, Congress can protect the interests of all parties in
the dumping cases.
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